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Abstract
Do political institutions limit rent-seeking by politicians? To address this question, we study
the transformation of petroleum rents into hidden wealth using unique data on bank deposits
in tax havens. We nd that petroleum rents are associated with increases in hidden wealth, but
only when political institutions are very weak. We also discern an interesting interaction with
political risk: events such as elections and domestic conict are preceded by increases in hidden
wealth when political institutions are weak, which is consistent with a view of autocratic rulers
as forward-looking rent-seekers whose behavior is constrained by political checks and balances.
1 Introduction
Political elites can abuse public o¢ ce to extract rents. Even moderate levels of political rents
may have socially undesirable e¤ects, through the adverse selection of political candidates and
by distorting political incentives (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Besley and Persson
(2011)). In countries without strong democratic governance, political rents can be substantial
and the economic and political consequences severe. The intensity of political rent-seeking can
be further exacerbated by the presence of unearned income (Smith, 2008), such as income from
petroleum and other natural resources (Robinson et al., 2006).1
In democracies and dictatorships alike, political institutions shape the incentives and con-
straints faced by political actors and can therefore potentially serve to control politicians and
prevent abuse of power. A large literature in political economy has investigated how institutions
a¤ect political outcomes in democracies under the assumption that politicians are self-interested
rent-seekers (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Similarly, a literature on the institutional foun-
dations of autocracies, including Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Acemoglu, Robinson and
Verdier (2004) and Besley and Kudamatsu (2007), begins from the assumption that autocratic
politicians are motivated by rents. Recent in-depth studies of autocracies, e.g. Blaydes (2011)
on Mubaraks Egypt, conrms the central role of such rents in explaining leader behavior.
While political rents thus feature prominently in theories of political economy, they are noto-
riously di¢ cult to quantify and investigate empirically. In contexts where political rents derive
from corruption and embezzlement, by their very nature characterized by secrecy, the empiri-
cal challenges are even more formidable. Existing empirical studies of political rents typically
use crude proxies, including Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) who measure opportunities for
kleptocracyby the government budget surplus, and Gandhi and Przeworski (2008) who use
the share of public sector wages in GDP to capture patronage.
1See also Ross (2001, 2012) and Cabrales and Hauk (2011)
In light of these measurement problems, it is interesting to note that abundant anecdotal
evidence connects political elites and oil money to o¤shore banking.2 These colorful accounts
describe how heads of states and other members of political elites use bank accounts in foreign
nancial centers to appropriate and launder public funds often originating from natural resource
rents. For example, a recent report by the Financial Action Task Force, a joint venture between
the OECD and the World Bank, lists 32 case studies of grand corruption, of which 27 involved
foreign bank accounts and 21 involved bank accounts in tax havens (FATF, 2011). In one of these
cases, the former President of petroleum-rich Nigeria, Sani Abacha, is safely estimated to have
embezzled between USD 2-4 billion during his four and a half year rule(FATF, 2011, p. 30).
The Abacha family had funds located on numerous bank accounts in at least twelve jurisdictions,
including well-known tax havens Switzerland, Jersey, Liechtenstein and the Cayman Islands.
In this paper, we shed light on the interaction between political institutions and political rents
by showing that lack of political checks and balances is a crucial factor in the transformation of
natural resource rents into personal wealth stashed away in secret bank accounts in tax havens.
Our key innovation is the use of a rich dataset on cross-border banking from the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) to construct a novel measure of hidden wealth. The BIS data
contains information from banks in 43 countries including the major tax havens Switzerland,
Luxembourg, Cayman Islands, Bahamas, Jersey and Singapore. For each of the 43 countries,
the BIS statistics provide information about bank deposits owned by residents of more than
200 countries at the bilateral level. For example, we observe the value of deposits held in Swiss
banks by residents of Saudi Arabia, in Luxembourg banks by residents of Nigeria, in Cayman
banks by residents of Venezuela, and so on. On the basis of the BIS statistics, we compute
annual country-level values of deposits held in havens. This measure of hidden wealth can be
computed for all countries in the world and is perfectly comparable across countries because
the data source is not the countries themselves but banks in well-regulated nancial centers.
2E.g. New York Times, 2006; Global Witness 2004; Financial Action Task Force, 2011.
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Equipped with this novel measure, we study the relationship between petroleum rents, political
risk and hidden nancial wealth.
Our rst nding is that when political institutions are poor, windfall gains from petroleum
extraction translate into larger stocks of hidden wealth. In autocratic regimes, there is a strong
and statistically signicant association between changes in petro rents and changes in tax haven
deposits whereas there is no such pattern in other political regimes. Within the class of au-
tocracies, even relatively weak political checks and balances, such as the existence of political
parties or a legislature, signicantly reduce the association between petro rents and tax haven
deposits. These ndings suggest that in countries with su¢ ciently weak political institutions,
rents from the petroleum sector are partly captured by political elites and hidden in havens.
We discuss a number of alternative interpretations, including tax avoidance by multinational
rms, tax evasion by domestic rms and households, and lack of local absorptive capacity, and
argue that these interpretations either do not t the observed empirical patterns, or are much
less plausible.
Our second nding is that when political institutions are poor, stocks of hidden wealth in-
crease in response to political risk. In autocracies, both elections and domestic conict such as
revolutions and guerilla warfare are preceded by increases in bank deposits held in havens. This
nding suggests that political elites anticipate political instability and respond by transferring
part of the wealth they have amassed domestically to havens. We also nd that the relation
between haven deposits and political risk is much more pronounced in petroleum rich autocra-
cies, which suggests that it reects kleptocratic precautionary savings responses by the political
elites who control the petroleum sector, rather than households and local rms responding to
political uncertainty by hiding wealth.
The e¤ects of petroleum rents and political risk are not only statistically signicant in
a number of di¤erent specications but also of substantial magnitude. Our estimates suggest
that around 1.5%-2.5% of petroleum rents in autocracies are transferred to bank accounts in tax
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havens. In light of the anecdotal evidence showing that corrupt political leaders own a diversied
portfolio of foreign assets (e.g. Los Angeles Times, 2011), the share of petroleum rents that is
diverted and hidden abroad is likely to be considerably larger. Drawing on recent work showing
that the global portfolio of hidden nancial wealth consists of around 75% securities and 25%
cash on bank accounts (Zucman, 2013), our estimates suggest that 6%-10% of oil and gas rents
in autocracies are converted into hidden personal wealth. The estimated e¤ect of political events
is also sizable. For instance, elections in autocracies are associated with an 8% increase in bank
deposits in tax havens in the year preceding the election.
Our paper relates to a number of di¤erent literatures. First, we contribute to the strand
of the resource curse literature that emphasizes the importance of political institutions (e.g.
Mehlum et al., 2006). While we nd that petro rents are an important source of hidden wealth
in autocracies, we also nd that other types of income have essentially no e¤ect on hidden
wealth, suggesting that natural resources are, indeed, at the heart of the problem with excessive
political rents. Second, we add to a broader literature that attempts to detect and quantify
political corruption using indirect methods (e.g. Fisman, 2001; see Alt, Lassen and Ziblatt,
2013 for a survey). Third, the paper is related to the literature on comparative analysis of
autocratic regimes by showing that the degree of rent diversion correlates strongly with the
type of autocratic political institutions. In particular, despite considerable theoretical interest in
extractive autocratic regimes, including recent work on kleptocracies(Acemoglu et al., 2004),
there is no consensus on how to identify such regimes empirically. By analyzing autocratic
behavior in the form of rent diversion, our paper bridges the theoretical concepts and empirical
typologies, such as those proposed by Geddes (2003) and Cheibub et al. (2010), and takes the
rst steps towards a quantitative basis for the classication of extractive authoritarian regimes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: The next section describes the conceptual frame-
work and related literature. Section three presents the data and section four the empirical model.
Section ve presents the main results, section six considers robustness issues, and section seven
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provides a discussion of alternative explanations for our ndings. Section eight concludes.
2 Background: From petro rents to haven deposits
In this section we discuss why petroleum rents may end up at personal bank accounts in tax
havens, and how such a pattern can be expected to be inuenced by institutional characteristics.
Our argument rests on three main pillars: (i) the distinctive characteristics of the petroleum
industry; (ii) the level of accountability and checks and balances embedded in the political
institutions (iii) the existence of o¤shore nancial centers characterized by high levels of secrecy.
The petroleum industry has several properties that make it more prone to political rent
seeking than other industries. First, compared to non-extractive industries, pure economic
rents constitute a large share of the total output in the petroleum industry. Second, reliable
information about the size of the resource base, the costs of resource extraction, and the various
contracts that regulate the allocation of the rents are often not available to the general public
(Ross, 2012). Third, petroleum production is commonly under direct or indirect government
control (Smith, 2009). Together, a large rent share, lack of transparency and government control
suggest that the scope for rent extraction by political leaders is much larger in the petroleum
sector than in other sectors of the economy.
While there is certainly a potential for extraction of political rents from the petroleum
sector, the actual level of political rents may be constrained by political institutions through
at least two channels: First, institutions may inuence which political candidates are selected
into political o¢ ce. Second, institutions may work as e¤ective constraints on the actions that
the candidates can take once selected. This suggests that we should observe a higher share of
opportunistic candidates and more opportunity to get away with political rents in institutional
settings characterized by a lower level of political accountability and fewer political checks and
balances.
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These mechanisms imply that diversion of petroleum rents is more likely to take place in
autocracies than in democracies, but all autocracies are not the same. The literature has long
recognized that there is a large variation in institutional practices, and political, social and
economic outcomes within the autocratic regimes, and o¤ers a number of classications of these
regimes (Geddes et al., 2012; Cheibub et al., 2010). While these classications di¤er both in
the criteria used for regime categorization, and in actual regime typology, they all agree that
autocratic regimes vary in type, and level, of institutional constraints on the ruling power. In
particular, many authoritarian regimes have established institutional mechanisms resembling
those of democracies, such as elections, political parties and legislatures. The rationale for these
institutions in autocracies would typically di¤er from the democratic checks and balances. For
example, the ruler may need to limit her discretion to keep the loyalty of the selectorate (e.g.
Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), to alleviate the threat to the regime from potential rivals
(e.g., Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006) or the masses (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). In
all such cases, institutions are viewed, to a varying degree, as constraints on the choices of the
autocratic rulers. This suggests that the institutional setting matters for the extent of political
rent extraction also within the sample of autocracies.
The constraints on autocratic rulers may to some extent be circumvented if political rents
can be extracted secretly. If invested or consumed domestically, political rents are highly visible,
which can provoke resistance against the regime. Additionally, domestically invested rents may
be easily appropriated by a new leadership in case the ruler is ousted. This points to two distinct
rationales for holding political rents in foreign jurisdictions: secrecy and asset protection. A
number of o¤shore nancial centers, commonly known as tax havens, specialize in exactly these
two services. Specically, tax havens typically combine strict bank secrecy rules that ensure
almost impenetrable condentiality and trust laws that enable investors to protect their assets
by transferring formal ownership to a trustee while still retaining the ultimate control of the
assets. The fact that tax havens are ideal jurisdictions for laundering and hiding political rents
6
suggests that we should expect a non-trivial share of diverted resource rents to be held exactly
here.
Finally, the incentive to extract political rents and hide them in tax havens is likely to depend
on the amount of political uncertainty and to change around events associated with a risk of
losing power such as elections, mass demonstrations, riots, etcetera. Indeed, the literature on
electoral authoritarianism stresses that elections are inherently risky for autocratic rulers (e.g.
Cox, 2009; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). Specically, elections involve a risk because they can
play a role in mobilizing the opposition (Geddes, 2006) and because rulers may unexpectedly
lose them (Przeworski et al., 2000). Similarly, events such as demonstrations against the regime,
riots and the onset of guerilla warfare arguably represent an increase in the risk of losing power
from the perspective of the ruler. While we would expect rulers to react to such adverse signals
about the probability of losing power, it is not immediately clear what the reaction should be.
On one hand, political risk may induce rulers to engage in kleptocratic precautionary saving
by transferring more funds to tax havens. On the other hand, rulers may choose to forego or
even repatriate haven funds with the aim of buying support from the selectorate or nancing
repression. Which e¤ect dominates is an empirical question.
3 Data
3.1 Deposits
The deposit data derive from the Locational Banking Statistics of the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS). There are currently 43 countries reporting banking statistics to the BIS
including all major nancial centers. The banking statistics cover the period 1977-2011.3
314 countries have reported since 1977 whereas the remaining 29 countries started reporting later. Switzerland
changed their reporting in the fourth quarter of 1989 to include o¤-balance sheet duciary business in their
deposit measure, causing a discrete jump in reported deposits held in Swiss banks. This jump is captured by
time dummies. All main results continue to hold if we restrict the sample to the period 1990-2008.
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The primary source of the deposit data is bank balance sheets. In each of the 43 BIS coun-
tries, individual banks furnish the central bank with information about their foreign positions
including a decomposition on counterpart countries. The central bank aggregates this infor-
mation to the bilateral level and report to the BIS. In the BIS statistics, we thus observe the
liabilities of banks in country i against residents of country j where i is any one of the 43 BIS
countries and j is any one of the more than 200 countries of the world. The vast majority of
foreign liabilities take the form of deposits.4 The BIS data thus provide us with a bilateral
measure of foreign bank deposits covering all major international banking centers. For instance,
we observe deposits held in Swiss banks by residents of Saudi Arabia, in Luxembourg banks by
residents of Nigeria and in Cayman banks by residents of Venezuela.
We classify 19 of the BIS reporting countries as tax havens and the remaining 24 as non-
havens.5 Our classication essentially reects whether a given country complies with the OECD
standard for exchange of banking information.6 Countries typically fail to comply with the
OECD standard because bank secrecy laws or similar provisions prevent them from sharing
bank information with foreign governments. We nd this particular criterion for distinguishing
between havens and non-havens appealing because secrecy is the main institutional feature that
is likely to attract hidden wealth. Many of the havens in our sample are indeed known to host
signicant wealth management industries and in the large majority of the fully investigated
cases of political leaders laundering the proceeds from corruption, at least one of the countries
we classify as havens (FATF, 2011) is involved.
4Starting from 1995, the BIS statistics contain a breakdown of total liabilities on deposits and other liabilities.
At the end of 2011, for instance, banks in BIS reporting countries had liabilities against foreign non-banks of
around USD 7,700 billion of which around USD 7,000 billion were deposits.
5The 19 havens are Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Chile, Cyprus,
Guernsey, Hong-Kong, Isle of Man, Jersey, Luxembourg, Macao, Malaysia, Netherlands Antilles (now Cura-
cao), Panama, Singapore and Switzerland.
6Our point of departure is the list of countries not complying with the OECD standard on information
exchange drawn up by the OECD in April 2009 (OECD, 2009). To this list we add Hong Kong and Macao.
These two countries did not comply with the OECD standard (OECD, 2008) and are widely regarded as tax
havens (e.g. Hines, 2010). However, they were not included in the OECD list of non-complying countries,
allegedly due to Chinese lobbying e¤orts (Guardian, 2009).
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On the basis of the BIS statistics, we dene havenit as deposits held by residents of country
i in the 19 havens in year t and nonhavenit as deposits held by residents of country i in the
24 non-havens in year t. Since the BIS data derive from statistical reports of banks on their
counterparts in foreign countries and not from the latter countries themselves, these variables
have the major advantages that coverage is universal and observations are perfectly comparable
across countries. It is hard to think of any other country-level measure of political rents that
would not be plagued by missing observations and limited comparability.
Several other features of the deposit data deserve mention. First, the BIS data allow us to
distinguish between deposits held by banks and deposits held by non-banks such as households,
rms and governments. Since interbank deposits are unlikely to play a role in the laundering of
political rents, we only include deposits held by non-banks in our deposit measures. Second, the
BIS data provide a measure of one form of hidden wealth, deposits, but contain no information
on other forms, most importantly securities. According to recent estimates, deposits account for
around 25% of the wealth managed in tax havens (Zucman, 2013). Third, the BIS data are based
on immediate ownership rather than ultimate ownership. In the case where a resident of Nigeria
owns a sham corporation in Panama, which in turn holds a bank account in Switzerland, the
BIS statistics therefore wrongly record the Swiss deposit as belonging to a resident of Panama.
It is well-known that sham corporations in Panama and other havens are sometimes used by
owners of hidden wealth to add a layer of secrecy between themselves and their assets (Sharman,
2010; Sharman et al., 2014). In the BIS statistics, around 25% of all deposits in tax havens are
recorded as belonging to other tax havens and there is strong evidence that this reects the use
of sham structures by residents in third countries (Johannesen and Zucman, 2013). We thus
exclude deposits in havens assigned to other havens by the BIS statistics from the sample for
the simple reason that we cannot credibly identify the residence country of their ultimate owner.
This implies that the e¤ect of petroleum rents on haven deposits will tend to be underestimated.
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3.2 Other variables
Our measure of oil and gas rents is from the World Banks Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) data-
base.7 The rent measure is computed as the market value of the estimated production of oil
and gas net of the estimated production costs. We thus dene the variable petrorentit as rents
from oil and gas production in country i in year t. The variable covers up to 211 countries in
the period 1970-2008.
The most important control variable in our regressions is netgdpit, which measures income
from other sources than oil and gas rents. This control variable allows us to estimate not only
whether oil and gas rents are associated with higher foreign deposits but also whether oil and
gas rents give rise to larger increases in foreign deposits than other types of income. In the
main regressions, netgdpit is constructed by subtracting petrorentit from the measure of gross
domestic product from the World Development Indicators.8
The key question of the paper is whether the transformation of resource rents into political
rents depends on the prevailing political institutions. Our preferred way to address the question
is to split the sample according to the type of the political regime and run separate regressions
for di¤erent regimes. We rst categorize regimes on the basis of the Polity 2 index (Marshall
and Jaggers, 2009). The Polity 2 index combines ratings on the competitiveness and openness
of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, and competitiveness of political
participation into a single index running from -10 to 10, where -10 refers to strongly autocratic
and 10 to strongly democratic. We categorize country-years with a Polity 2 score greater than
5 as democracies, country-years with a Polity 2 score between -5 and 5 as intermediate regimes
and country-years with a Polity 2 score lower than -5 as autocracies.9
7The ANS dataset is currently the most frequently used source of data on oil and gas rents. For an overview of
di¤erent oil and gas variables, their strengths and weaknesses, and how they have been employed in the resource
curse literature, see van der Ploeg (2011). We show below that another commonly used measure, fuel exports,
generates similar results.
8The results are robust to using an alternative income measure that captures total value added in all industries
except mining and utilities as measured by the National Accounts Database of the United Nations.
9The results are not sensitive to the exact threshold values.
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We also employ an alternative institutional measure developed by Przeworski et al. (2000)
and updated by Cheibub et al. (2010). According to this measure, regimes are classied as
democracies if a number of criteria are met, including that the executive is elected, that there
is a legal basis for political parties and that a legislature exists, and as non-democracies if not.
Since classication as a democracy requires a number of criteria to be met, there is considerable
heterogeneity within the group of non-democracies with some regimes meeting none of the
criteria and others meeting all but one. We exploit this variation to learn more about the role
of political institutions in limiting political rent seeking in autocracies.10
In most specications, we use a number of control variables. We will briey describe these
variables as they are introduced into the model in section 5. We refer to the Appendix for
accurate data sources, precise denitions of variables and summary statistics.
3.3 Description of main variables
Deposits in tax havens have increased rapidly, and more rapidly than GDP, over the sample
period. In 1977, total deposits in tax havens amounted to around USD 12 billion or less than
0.2% of world GDP whereas in 2008 the corresponding gure was around USD 2,800 billion or
around 4.6% of world GDP.
As shown in the rst column of Table 1, petroleum rich autocracies accounted for an average
of 8% of the global stock of haven deposits over the sample period. However, as shown in the
second column, haven deposits were much larger in petroleum rich autocracies than in other
countries when measured relative to the size of the economy. In the sample of intermediate
and democratic countries, the ratio of haven deposits to GDP was between 1% and 2% with no
noticeable di¤erence between petroleum rich and petroleum poor countries. In the sample of
10As noted by Przworski et al. (2000, p. 23) some regimes satisfy all the requirements for being a democracy,
but the same party nevertheless wins every election. This raises doubt about whether the ruler(s) would in fact
be willing to relinquish power should election results go against them. We consider this alternation problem
explicitly in the empirical analysis.
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autocracies, on the other hand, the ratio was well above 6% for petroleum rich countries and no
higher than 0.5% for petroleum poor countries. This striking pattern in the aggregate data is
clearly consistent with our main regression result that petroleum rents increase haven deposits
in autocracies but not in other regime types.
Table 1 somewhere around here.
The size of oil and gas rents is strongly inuenced by the oil price, which has been very
volatile over the sample period. Total oil and gas rents as a share of world GDP thus peaked
at 7.6% in 1979, reached a bottom of 1% in 1998 and later increased to 5.3% in 2008. In 2008,
95 countries had positive petroleum rents. In some of these countries, the ratio of petroleum
rents to GDP was negligible, but in many others it was considerable, for instance around 20%
in Norway, 30% in Venezuela and 70% in Angola and Saudi Arabia. Petroleum rents were
roughly equally distributed across countries of di¤erent regime type: autocracies accounted for
an average of around 35% of global petroleum rents over the sample period with around 25%
and 40% accruing to intermediate and democratic countries, respectively. However, autocracies
depended relatively more on petroleum rents to generate income than other countries: in autoc-
racies petroleum rents constituted around 18% of GDP on average compared to around 6% in
intermediate countries and around 1.5% in democracies.
As illustrated in Figures 1a and 1b, there is considerable year-to-year variation in haven
deposits and petroleum rents within countries. The gures show the distribution of annual
growth rates in haven deposits and petroleum rents, respectively, across all country-years. The
median annual growth rate in haven deposits is around 10%, but in almost one third of all
country-years, haven deposits declined relative to the previous year. Similarly, the median
annual growth rate in petroleum rents is around 6%, but in more than 40% of all country-years,
petroleum rents exhibited a negative growth rate.
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Figures 1a-1b somewhere around here.
4 Empirical model
Our baseline model is specied in the following way:
havenratit =  + havenratit 1 + petrorentratit + netgdpratit + "it;
where we condition on political institutions by estimating the model for di¤erent regime types
separately.
The variables haven, petrorent and netgdprat introduced in the previous section are trans-
formed in two ways before they enter the model. First, the variables are di¤erenced as indicated
by the operator . The levels of the three variables are all highly trended and non-stationary
whereas their rst-di¤erences pass standard panel tests for stationarity, making the baseline
model in di¤erences amenable to standard panel data techniques.11 Second, the variables are
scaled with the average GDP of the relevant country taken over the sample period as indicated
by the extension rat. The scaling makes our measures of haven deposits, resource rents and
other income comparable across countries of very di¤erent sizes, which has several advantages.
Most importantly, it will later allow us to augment the model with time dummies necessary to
account for common shocks. If the variables were not scaled, time dummies would impose the
untenable restriction that countries of very di¤erent sizes experience the same underlying time
trend in haven deposits in dollar terms. Additionally, the scaling ensures that identication
derives from variation in both large and small countries. If the variables were not scaled, the
estimates would e¤ectively be identied by the variation in a few countries such as China and
11We have conducted a variety of standard panel unit root tests on the rst di¤erenced ratio variables and
consistently nd that the null hypothesis of a unit root in all series can be rejected at conventional levels of
statistical signicance. The results from the panel unit root tests are reported in the online Appendix.
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the U.S. with very large haven deposits and very large resource rents. Note that scaling with
average GDP does not change the interpretation of , which is the dollar increase in haven
deposits associated with a dollar increase in petroleum rents.
An obvious alternative to scaling by average GDP would be to scale by current GDP; how-
ever, this approach would introduce a mechanical positive correlation between the scaled deposit
variables and the scaled petroleum rent variable. Measurement error in GDP, for instance, would
not a¤ect the levels of deposits and petro rents but would move their ratios to current GDP in
the same direction. Additionally, since current petroleum rents enter current GDP, shocks to
petroleum rents would a¤ect petrorentrat directly but also the other terms of the equation
through changes in the scaling factor. Another alternative would be to estimate the model with
unscaled variables despite the issues described above. We note that in both cases the e¤ects
of petroleum rents are similar in terms of sign and signicance levels to our main specication
of scaling with average GDP (results available upon request). A nal alternative would be to
estimate the model in log-levels. We discard this approach because a constant elasticity of
haven deposits with respect to petro rents seems much less plausible than the assumption of a
constant marginal e¤ect of petroleum rents on haven deposits.12
We extend the baseline model in several ways. As mentioned, we include time dummies.
This extension addresses the concern that a positive correlation between haven deposits and
oil rents in the baseline model may simply reect that time periods with increasing oil prices
happen to coincide with other events causing increases in haven deposits such as advances in
wire transfer technology. Moreover, we include a set of covariates including capital controls,
ination, nancial deepness and political controls, which we suspect may a¤ect the growth in
haven deposits.
12To see this, note that in a country with negligible resource rents and large stocks of haven deposits (e.g.
Germany), a ten percent increase in petro rents would cause a negligible percentage change in haven deposits
even if the entire windfall gain were funneled to haven accounts. On the other hand, in a country with large
resource rents (e.g. Saudi Arabia), a ten percent increase in petro rents would constitute an enormous windfall
gain that may very well cause a signicant percentage change in haven deposits.
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Finally, note that our baseline specication implicitly accounts for xed e¤ects in levels,
due to the rst-di¤erencing. In our robustness analysis, we also include country xed e¤ects
in our main specication, but here these e¤ectively amount to country-specic linear trends in
deposits. On one hand, this extension addresses the issue that a positive correlation between
haven deposits and petro rents in the baseline model could reect that petro-rich countries for
other reasons than the petroleum itself happen to have a higher underlying growth in haven
deposits than petro-poor countries. On the other hand, to the extent that petro-rich countries
have higher growth in haven deposits precisely because they are petro-rich, controlling for trends
have the undesirable e¤ect that a potentially important component of the variation in deposits
is unnecessarily eliminated. Since it is hard to make a strong a priori case for or against
controlling for country specic trends, we take a pragmatic approach: most specications do
not include country specic slope dummies, but we test whether the main results are robust to
these.
5 Main results
5.1 Petro rents and haven deposits
In the baseline specication we study how changes in haven deposits correlate with changes in
petroleum rents and changes in income from other sources.13 The results are summarized in
Table 2. All standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Table 2 somewhere around here.
13Throughout, we discard countries with average stocks of haven deposits below USD 10 million because the
BIS deposit data are reported in integer number of millions, which is a potential source of measurement error
at low deposit stocks. The results are qualitatively unchanged when including these countries in the sample.
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As can be seen from column 1, there is a signicant correlation between changes in haven
deposits and changes in petroleum rents in the full sample of 115 countries. Columns 2-4 show,
however, that the coe¢ cient is not uniform across regime types. A dollar increase in petroleum
rents is associated with a 1.4 cent increase in haven deposits in autocracies while there is no
e¤ect in intermediate and democratic regimes. Conversely, shocks to other types of income have
roughly the same e¤ect in the three regime types. A dollar increase in other income is associated
with a 0.6 cent increase in haven deposits in autocracies and similar sized increases in the two
other regimes. In sum, the results suggest that in autocratic countries oil and gas rents are more
likely to be transferred to bank accounts in tax havens than other types of income whereas there
are no signs of a similar e¤ect in intermediate and democratic countries.
The baseline model establishes and highlights the key correlations of our paper, but obviously
does not account for a number of factors, which can plausibly a¤ect foreign deposits. For
instance, it may be that increases in oil and gas prices incidentally coincided with other, perhaps
unobserved, developments that caused an increasing trend in cross-border deposits or that
countries experiencing large growth in petro rents also share other characteristics, perhaps
nancial or political instability, that caused relatively large growth in foreign deposits.
In order to control for these factors we extend the model along two lines. First, we include
year dummies that exibly capture any time trend in haven deposits common to all countries
of a given regime type. Second, we introduce nancial and political covariates with the aim
of controlling for the incentives of the private sector to place funds on foreign bank accounts.
The nancial covariates are: a measure of de jure capital account openness, kaopenit, which
reects the absence of restrictions on cross-border nancial transactions (Chinn and Ito, 2008);
a measure of liquid liabilities in the domestic banking sector, liabilitiesit, which is often used
to proxy for nancial sector development and sophistication (Levine, 1997); and a dummy for
ination rates above 40%, highinflationit, which has previously been used as an indicator of a
high-ination environment (Bruno and Easterly, 1998). We expect nancial openness and high
16
ination to induce more foreign deposits, whereas a more developed nancial sector may both
facilitate contact with foreign banks and provide an alternative to using them.
The political covariates are: a dummy for domestic presidential or parliamentary elections,
electionit and a dummy for domestic political conict, conflictdumit; described in more detail
below and based on CNTS data (Banks, 2011). Both elections and domestic conict could be
associated with more foreign bank deposits, if political elites attempt to protect assets by moving
them abroad in the face of political instability, or with less foreign bank deposits, if political
elites spend resources on electoral campaigning, public good provision or military capacity with
the aim of inuencing the direction of political development.
The results from the extended model are presented in Table 3. The results are similar to
those of Table 2. In autocracies, a dollar increase in petroleum rents is associated with a 2.2
cent increase in haven deposits whereas a dollar increase in other types of income increase haven
deposits by around 0.6 cents (column 2). In the other regimes, the e¤ect of oil and gas rents
on haven deposits is close to zero and not signicantly di¤erent from the e¤ect of other income
shocks (column 3-4).
Table 3 somewhere around here.
As for the covariates, nancial openness, high ination and nancial sector development
are generally associated with more foreign deposits, the latter result suggesting that the role
of domestic nancial institutions in facilitating contact with foreign banks is more important
than providing an alternative to them. Both elections and conicts tend to be associated with
less haven deposits. The covariates are often not statistically signicant although the positive
correlation between nancial openness and nancial sector development on one hand and the
change in haven deposits on the other is fairly strong for non-democracies.14
14Introducing covariates causes a considerable reduction in sample size especially for autocracies. The nancial
and political variables generally have lower coverage than the main variables in both the time and cross-section
dimensions, hence the loss of observations.
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5.2 Political risk
The results reported in Table 3 suggest a rather weak e¤ect of elections and conict on deposits
in havens, which is puzzling in view of the ample anecdotal evidence on the relation between
political events and capital ight. To further explore the role of political events, we modify
the model along two dimensions. First, we account more carefully for the timing of political
events. The previous model allowed only for a contemporaneous e¤ect of political events on
foreign deposits. It is plausible, however, that political elites move assets abroad in anticipation
of political events that are expected to cause instability and threaten their political control.15
Likewise, political events may trigger capital ows in subsequent periods as the tension asso-
ciated with elections, mass demonstrations or other events resolves. We thus introduce lagged
and leaded values of the political variables to allow for anticipatory and delayed e¤ects of po-
litical events. Second, we exploit variation in the intensity of domestic conicts. Specically,
we use changes in the domestic conict index of the CNTS dataset conflictindexit as our ex-
planatory variable rather than the simple conict dummy used above. The index is normalized
to take values between 0 and 1, and is a weighted index of instances of assassinations, gen-
eral strikes, guerilla warfare, government crises, purges, riots, revolutions, and anti-government
demonstrations.
The results presented in Table 4 suggest that political events in autocracies are associated
with strong anticipatory increases in haven deposits. In the year preceding an election, havenrat
increases by 0.0022 on average in autocracies (column 1) corresponding to a 8% increase in haven
deposits evaluated at the sample mean. In the election year itself and the following year, there
are no signicant changes in haven deposits. Similarly, in a year preceding a 0.1 increase in
the conict index, havenrat increases by 0.0009 on average in autocracies corresponding to a
3% increase in haven deposits evaluated at the sample mean whereas there are no signicant
15Such anticipation may even be reected in the market, as evidenced by Fismans (2001) account of how the
stock market value of rms known to be politically connected to the Suharto regime in Indonesia was strongly
inuenced by rumours of Suhartos death.
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contemporaneous or delayed e¤ects; a more detailed investigation of the components of the
conict index shows that these results are driven by future changes in the variables guerilla
warfare and revolutions (results not reported).16 Reassuringly, the coe¢ cient on petroleum
rents remains largely unchanged relative to Table 3. A dollar increase in oil and gas rents is
now associated with a 2.4 cent increase in haven deposits in autocracies. Political events have
no e¤ect on haven deposits in intermediate and democratic regimes (results not reported).
Table 4 somewhere around here.
In the background section, we discussed how elections and other political events that reduce
the probability of political survival could change the incentives for rulers to extract and hide
resource rents. The results suggest that the ruling elites anticipate both elections and other
events associated with political instability and respond to them by transferring funds to safe
havens. The nding that rulers appear to successfully predict political instability is less surpris-
ing if one considers that private insurance companies expend considerable resources attempting
to forecast the likelihood of future political violence (Jensen and Young, 2009). Assuming that
rulers and political elites have access to at least as much information as insurance companies,
we should expect them to detect and act upon adverse signals about the probability of regime
survival.
In the next step, we study the interaction between petro rents and political events. Until
now, we have found that positive shocks to oil and gas rents in autocracies are associated
with increases in haven deposits (Table 3) suggesting that part of the petro rents are captured
by political elites and hidden in tax havens. We have also found that events giving rise to
political uncertainty in autocracies such as elections and mass demonstrations are associated
with increases in haven deposits (rst column of Table 4) suggesting that political elites respond
16Other more narrow conict measures exist. However, we focus on the CNTS data, since we are interested
in capturing non-election replacement risk in the broadest way possible, and not in armed conict per se.
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to uncertainty by hiding part of their wealth in tax havens. These results point to a possible
interaction between oil and gas rents and political events. If petro rents are easier to appropriate
for political elites than other types of income, then we should expect that political uncertainty
gives rise to more capital ight in oil rich countries than in oil poor countries.
We test this hypothesis by constructing dummy variables for high and low oil rents and
extending the model with the interaction between these variables and the leaded election and
conict variables. Specically, we dene the dummy variables highpetroi and lowpetroi indicat-
ing countries with average annual oil and gas rents above and below 5% of GDP respectively.
As shown in the second column of Table 4, the e¤ect of political events on haven deposits dif-
fer substantially between oil-rich autocracies and oil-poor autocracies. In oil-rich autocracies,
havenrat increases by around 0.0029 in a year preceding an election while there is no such e¤ect
in oil-poor autocracies. Similarly, in oil-rich autocracies, havenrat increases by around 0.0014
in a year preceding a 0.1 increase in the conict index whereas in oil-poor autocracies havenrat
increases by only around two-thirds of that gure. There are no clear signs of interaction e¤ects
in intermediate and democratic regimes (results not reported).
5.3 Political regimes
The measurement of political regimes is not universally agreed upon, and the Polity index is
not without critics. In this section, we document that our results extend to another standard
measure of political regimes: the democracy-autocracy measure originally developed by Prze-
worski et al. (2000). In addition to providing assurance that our results on the link between
petro rents and political rents are not artifacts of a particular measure of political regimes, the
operational rules used by Przeworski et al. for classifying regimes allow us to examine in more
detail how political institutions and regime characteristics shape the size of political rents in
non-democracies.
We rst run the baseline model with covariates on the sample of non-democracies based on
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the denition developed by Przeworski et al. As shown in column 1 of Table 5, there is no sig-
nicant association between petro rents and haven deposits in this sample. The explanation is
quite straightforward. Our sample of non-democracies consists of more than 800 country-years
whereas our autocracy sample based on the Polity index consists of just over 400 country-years.
It seems likely that the former sample encompasses a large number of country-years where in-
stitutional constraints are su¢ ciently strong to deter signicant political diversion of petroleum
rents. We explore this hypothesis by testing whether di¤erences across non-democracies in the
degree to which petroleum rents are transformed into hidden wealth rents can be explained by
institutional characteristics.
Table 5 somewhere around here.
We use the operational rules from the denition of democratic regimes in Przeworski et al.
(2000, pp. 18-30) to distinguish countries within the group of non-democracies. Specically, we
focus on the following characteristics: Whether the executive is elected or not, whether political
parties are legal, whether political parties exist in practice, and whether a legislature exists.
There is considerable correlation between these characteristics such that countries without an
elected executive are also more likely to have no political parties.
We include indicator variables for each of the four institutional characteristics one by one
as well as their interaction with petroleum rents. When interpreting the interaction terms, it
should be noted that they are all coded such that the base case is always that of the most
autocratic regimes. Results for the full sample of non-democracies are presented in columns
2-5. In countries with no election of the executive increases in petroleum rents are accompanied
by signicant increases in haven deposits while in countries with indirect and direct election of
the executive there is no such e¤ect (column 2). The same pattern is repeated in the following
three columns: in countries in which parties are legally banned (column 3), in which there are no
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parties in practice (column 4) and in which there is no legislature or a non-partisan legislature
(column 5), there is a signicant e¤ect of petro rents on deposits in havens.
To check validity with institutional rules from other sources, we use an indicator variable
for whether the incumbent leader has a nite term in o¢ ce from the Database of Political
Institutions (Beck et al., 2001). As shown in column (6), there is a positive association between
petroleum rents and haven deposits only in the subset of non-democracies where the incumbent
leader has no nite term in o¢ ce.17
Finally, we correct directly for the alternation rule problem of Przeworski et al. described
above: some regimes formally satisfy the criteria for being a democracy, but since no trans-
fer of power was observed during the regimes, they may in fact be non-democracies and are
coded as such. We augment the model with an indicator variable for these cases, reported by
Cheibub et al. (2010), as well as its interaction with petroleum rents, to correct for the poten-
tial misclassication. Column (7) shows that in countries coded as non-democracies due to the
alternation rule, there is no positive association between petroleum rents and haven deposits.
In fact, this group of countries behave very much like democracies; in a similar analysis for the
full sample of both democracies and non-democracies, there is no statistical di¤erence between
countries coded democracies and countries coded non-democracies due to the alternation rule.
This suggests that, at least for our outcome, the latter group consists, in fact, of democracies.
Together, these results, by pointing to specic subsets of non-democracies where a signicant
share of petroleum rents are transformed into hidden wealth and other subsets where this is
not the case, are a rst step toward developing a quantitative foundation for terms such as
kleptocracies, sultanism and neopatrimonialism.
17We also examined the basis for our categorization of political regimes. The Polity2 index is comprised of
several sub-indices, and our results seem primarily to reect di¤erences across countries in constraints on the
executiveand competitiveness of the executive recruitment.
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6 Alternative measures and robustness tests
6.1 Deposits in non-havens
So far, we have studied the e¤ect of petroleum rents and political uncertainty on bank deposits
in havens, which we consider a relatively clean measure of hidden wealth. After all, what gives
havens like Switzerland and Singapore a comparative advantage over other international bank-
ing centers is not generous returns or innovative nancial products but a legal environment
conducive to secrecy. The case-based evidence discussed earlier suggests, however, that a con-
siderable share of illegal political rents is invested in countries that are not usually considered
havens such as USA, UK and France. This is conrmed by recent academic studies showing that
some anti-money laundering rules are applied more strictly in traditional havens than in the
UK and the US (Sharman, 2010; Sharman et al., 2014). It is thus natural to include these coun-
tries in our analysis despite the obvious complication that they are also major destinations of
funds related to perfectly legitimate transactions driven by, for instance, trade or foreign direct
investment. To test whether increases in oil and gas rents are systematically associated with
wealth invested in non-havens, we estimate the baseline model with nonhavenrat as dependent
variable. As reported in column 1 of Table 6, there is no association between petroleum rents
and deposits in non-havens.
Table 6 somewhere around here.
6.2 Fuel exports
Our preferred measure of petroleum rents measures the market value of oil and gas production
net of production costs. To the extent that the oil and gas is consumed domestically it may be
sold below the world market rate, hence petrorent can be perceived as a measure of potential
rather than realized petro rents. We use international trade statistics to construct an alternative
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measure of petro rents that more closely tracks the cash-ow from petroleum extraction in hard
currencies. Specically, we dene fuelexport as the value of exports of mineral fuels, lubricants
and related materials as reported in the COMTRADE database.18
We estimate the baseline model with fuel exports as the main independent variable instead of
petroleum rents. In autocracies, a dollar increase in fuel exports is associated with an increase
in haven deposits of 2.4 cents (column 2) whereas there is no such e¤ect in the sample of
intermediate regimes and democracies (results not reported). This pattern is strikingly similar
to the results from the baseline regression reported in Table 3.
6.3 Corruption
We explore whether the patterns we observe can be explained by di¤erences in another key
measure of institutional quality, corruption. For this purpose, we use a commonly employed
indicator of perceived corruption, the ICRG index of corruption, where higher values signify less
perceived corruption.19 We note that the Polity2 index and the ICRG index are signicantly
positively correlated in our sample with a correlation coe¢ cient around 0.41.
We nd only weak evidence of an interaction between corruption and the e¤ect of natural
resources. When splitting the sample on the basis of the ICRG index of corruption instead
of the Polity2 index, we nd no systematically di¤erent e¤ects of petroleum rents on haven
deposits across subsamples (results not reported). When using the full sample, an interaction
between the corruption measure and changes in petroleum rents is marginally signicant, with
more corrupt countries exhibiting a stronger e¤ect of petroleum rents on haven deposits, but
this interaction e¤ect vanishes when also including the interaction with the Polity2 index, which
is signicant in its own right (results not reported).
18We use trade data at the 1-digit disaggregation level, which besides exports of oil and gas also comprises
exports of coal and electricity, because the more disaggregated 2-digit data, with which we would in principle
be able to study only exports of oil and gas, contains many missing values.
19Most other commonly used corruption indices are not available for the early part of our sample.
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There are several possible explanations for this non-nding: First, countries that place the
proceeds of petroleum rents in tax havens may have been perceived as (relatively) less corrupt
since such deposits are less salient than other assets because of the lack of transparency in the
petroleum sector and the secrecy provided by tax havens. This is related to the more general
critique of perception-based corruption indices, such as Treisman (2007). Second, the ICRG
index itself may have been more focused on bureaucratic corruption than on the type of grand
corruption and rent seeking considered here and, hence, be a more noisy measure of political
corruption.
6.4 Patronage
An alternative to transforming petroleum rents into personal wealth is to use them on public
goods provision and patronage to secure the political support of the selectorate (Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2003; Robinson et al., 2006; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Blaydes, 2009). To
explore this, we estimate regressions similar to those reported in Table 3, replacing o¤shore bank
deposits with changes in government consumption as a share of average GDP as the dependent
variable. In results not reported (available as appendix Table A.4 for reviewers), we nd that
in autocracies, an increase in petro rents of 1 dollar increases government consumption by 10
cent, statistically signicant at the 1 % level. However, shocks to other types of income changes,
captured by changes in net GDP, have almost exactly the same e¤ect, suggesting that there are
no disproportionate responses of government consumption to oil shocks. Indeed, in xed e¤ects
specications, the e¤ects of petro rents on government consumption is signicantly lower than
that of other types of income.
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6.5 Country-specic trends
Finally, we extend the baseline specications with country xed e¤ects. Since the model is in
rst-di¤erences, this implies that we control for country-specic linear trends in havenrat and,
consequently, that the coe¢ cient on petrorent now measures how shocks to oil and gas rents
correlate with deviations from these country-specic trends. As shown in columns 3 and 4, the
results are roughly unchanged.
7 Discussion
The main patterns emerging from the data are the following: When autocracies experience a
dollar increase in rents from oil and gas production, haven deposits increase by around 2 cents
whereas increases in other types of income are associated with much smaller increases in haven
deposits, at most 0.7 cent per dollar. When autocracies experience an increase in political risk
in the form of upcoming elections and domestic conict, haven deposits increase signicantly, a
correlation which is particularly strong in oil rich autocracies. For intermediate and democratic
regimes, neither oil and gas rents nor political events correlate with the value of haven deposits.
Under our preferred interpretation, the changes in haven deposits observed around oil shocks
and political shocks in autocracies reect hidden political rents: Windfall gains from oil and
gas production are partly captured by political elites and transferred to private bank accounts
in havens; and in the face of political instability political elites transfer part of the wealth they
have amassed domestically to havens. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that oil
and gas production is typically directly or indirectly controlled by governments and with the
abundant anecdotal evidence on corrupt rulers in oil-rich autocracies like Nigeria, Libya and
Equatorial Guinea accumulating vast private fortunes abroad. It is also in line with the political
incentives facing self-interested elites: Moving captured petro rents to secret accounts in havens
provides protection against expropriation in case they are ousted from power; and the perceived
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risk of expropriation is likely to increase in election years and periods of domestic conict thus
strengthening the incentive to hide funds in havens.20 Finally, it is consistent with the lack
of correlation between windfall gains, political events and haven deposits in intermediate and
democratic regimes: a distinguishing feature of autocracies is the lack of political constraints
and electoral accountability, which facilitates the conversion of petro rents into personal wealth
of political elites.
Other interpretations of the results are, of course, possible but, as we argue in the following,
less plausible. First, it may be suspected that the correlation between oil and gas rents and
haven deposits is related to the presence of multinational rms in the petro-industry. Hines
(2010) argues that developing countries are particularly vulnerable to tax avoidance by multi-
national rms whereby taxable prots are shifted to tax havens through transfer pricing or thin
capitalization. This, seemingly, suggests an alternative explanation for our empirical ndings
according to which the oil and gas rents transferred to tax havens belong to multinational rms
rather than domestic elites. This interpretation, however, can largely be ruled out because of
the way the deposit data are constructed. For instance, if a multinational oil company uses
transfer pricing to shift prots from a Nigerian a¢ liate to a Cayman a¢ liate in order to reduce
tax payments in Nigeria, the funds would be legally owned by the Cayman a¢ liate and therefore
assigned to the Cayman Islands and not Nigeria in the BIS statistics.
Second, oil and gas windfall gains may lead to higher incomes more widely in the domestic
economy: local suppliers to the petro-industry benet directly from an oil boom whereas other
local rms may benet from increases in aggregate demand stimulated by increased government
spending and demand multipliers. Could the observed increase in haven deposits following
20In recent years, international cooperation over freezing and potentially recovering stolen assets has increased;
for example, The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative launched in September 2007 by the World Bank and the United
Nations O¢ ce on Drugs and Crime aims at assisting developing countries in recovering assets held abroad,
typically by former rulers and their political connections. If succesful, such initiatives may make hiding wealth
in tax havens a less attractive option for kleptocratic rulers and political elites. So far, however, results have
been meager: only USD 5 billion in total have been recovered out of an estimated annual loss of between USD
20 and 40 billion (OECD and the World Bank, 2011).
27
increases in oil and gas rents reect that other domestic groups than political elites transfer
funds to tax havens in order to evade income taxes? We do not nd this explanation plausible.
Signicant oil producers such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Qatar have
no income taxes, hence tax evasion is clearly not an issue. Most of the other autocracies in our
sample are developing countries where tax enforcement is typically lax suggesting that much
simpler tax evasion techniques are available than those involving foreign bank accounts.
Finally, our empirical results could potentially reect di¤erences in absorptive capacity across
di¤erent categories of countries. In particular, investment opportunities may generally be lower
in developing countries, which dominate our sample of autocracies, than in developed countries,
which could explain why a larger share of petro rents in the former countries is invested abroad.
This does not, however, account for the nding that shocks to oil and gas rents are more likely
to translate into foreign deposits than other types of income. Moreover, it seems inconsistent
with the nding that higher oil and gas rents in autocracies lead to more deposits in havens
but not to more deposits in non-havens. If windfall gains in the oil and gas sector would be
invested abroad due to lack of domestic investment opportunities, it is not clear why investments
would primarily take place in havens. This is especially true because we observe the opposite
pattern for the sample of intermediate regimes where political elites face more constraints and
some measure of electoral accountability. In this sample, which also comprises many developing
countries, windfall gains in the oil and gas sector do not lead to more deposits in havens.
8 Conclusion
We employ new data on bank deposits in tax havens to examine the transformation of petro
rents into hidden wealth. We nd that increases in oil and gas rents increase the value of a
countrys bank deposits in havens  jurisdictions typically associated with banking secrecy 
but also that this is true only for autocracies. This is consistent with a model where rulers
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and political elites in countries with weak political constraints and lack of competitive elections
transform petroleum rents into political rents. This interpretation is supported by our ndings
that the share of petro rents transformed into hidden wealth increases in anticipation of political
events elections and political conict and that these political events a¤ect hidden wealth
primarily in petroleum rich countries.
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Table 1. Tax haven deposits: Descriptive statistics
Share of world haven 
deposits
Haven deposits as share 
of GDP
Autocracies 8.8% 2.7%
 ‐ petroleum rich 7.8% 6.7%
 ‐ not petroleum rich 1.0% 0.5%
Intermediate 7.9% 1.1%
 ‐ petroleum rich 3.4% 1.3%
 ‐ not petroleum rich 4.5% 1.0%
democracies 83.3% 1.9%
 ‐ petroleum rich 2.3% 1.8%
 ‐ not petroleum rich 80.9% 1.9%
Note: For the purposes of this table, countries are first divided into regime groups on the basis of the 
average  Polity2 score over the sample period and into petroleum producing groups on the basis of the 
average  petroleum rent /GDP ratio over the sample period (threshold 5%). To avoid confounding 
effects of countries entering and exiting the sample, the sample is restricted to countries for which 
observations are available for all years 1977‐2008. The first column is constructed in the following way: 
The share of total haven deposits of non‐havens owned by each of the regime‐petroleum groups is 
computed for each year; then the shares are averaged over the sample period.  The second column is 
constructed in the following way: The ratio of haven deposits to GDP within each of the regime‐
petroleum groups is computed for each year; then the ratios are averaged over the sample period. 
Table 2. Petro rents and tax haven deposits: Basic correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
Political regime All Autocracies Intermediate Democracies
Δhavenrat (lagged) 0.2086*** 0.1238 0.3355*** 0.2104**
(0.0611) (0.0905) (0.1092) (0.0871)
Δpetrorentrat 0.0074** 0.0137** 0.0003 0.0026
(0.0038) (0.0060) (0.0029) (0.0042)
Δnetgdprat 0.0069*** 0.0063*** 0.0080*** 0.0055***
(0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0014)
Constant 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0013*** 0.0016***
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Observations 2,960 797 550 1,505
Number of panelid 115 60 56 76
Time FE NO NO NO NO
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated with: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; and * 
p<0.1. 
 Δhavenrat
Table 3. Petro rents and tax haven deposits: Extended model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
Political regime All Autocracies Intermediate Democracies
Δhavenrat (lagged) 0.2844*** 0.4114*** 0.2398*** 0.2184**
(0.0682) (0.0855) (0.0698) (0.1029)
Δpetrorentrat 0.0081 0.0216*** ‐0.0043 0.0006
(0.0055) (0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0044)
Δnetgdprat ‐0.0001 0.0058** ‐0.0003 ‐0.0020
(0.0013) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0017)
kaopen 0.0002* 0.0005*** 0.0007** 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0001)
liabilities 0.0021 0.0040*** 0.0124*** 0.0006
(0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0041) (0.0014)
highinflation 0.0010* 0.0008 0.0019 0.0009
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0010)
election ‐0.0001 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0008 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004)
conflictdum ‐0.0007* ‐0.0010 ‐0.0011 ‐0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0004)
Constant 0.0028* ‐0.0060 0.0042 0.0043**
(0.0015) (0.0044) (0.0031) (0.0017)
Observations 2,336 446 463 1,371
Number of panelid 100 43 48 72
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated with: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; and * 
p<0.1. 
 Δhavenrat
Table 4. Political risk and tax haven deposits in autocracies
(1) (2)
Dependent variable
Δhavenrat (lagged) 0.3533*** 0.3479***
(0.0713) (0.0699)
Δpetrorentrat 0.0241*** 0.0240***
(0.0061) (0.0061)
Δnetgdprat 0.0037 0.0032
(0.0027) (0.0030)
kaopen 0.0008*** 0.0007***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
liabilities 0.0040*** 0.0039***
(0.0011) (0.0011)
highinflation 0.0000 ‐0.0000
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Δconflict (lagged) ‐0.0017
(0.0032)
Δconflict ‐0.0068
(0.0053)
Δconflict (leaded) 0.0087***
(0.0031)
Δconflictindex (leaded) × highpetro 0.0144**
(0.0059)
Δconflictindex (leaded) × lowpetro 0.0101**
(0.0040)
election (lagged) 0.0009
(0.0007)
election ‐0.0003
(0.0008)
election (leaded) 0.0022***
(0.0007)
election (leaded) × highpetro 0.0029***
(0.0011)
election (leaded) × lowpetro 0.0011
(0.0007)
Constant 0.0032 0.0034
(0.0067) (0.0070)
Observations 425 427
Number of panelid 42 42
Time FE YES YES
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated with:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; and * p<0.1. 
 Δhavenrat
Table 5. Dictatorships and Political Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6)
Dependent variable
Conditioning variable Exec 
selection
De jure 
parties
De facto 
parties
Legislative 
parties
Exec finite 
term 
Classification 
errors
Δhavenrat (lagged) 0.2491*** 0.2336*** 0.2378*** 0.2492*** 0.2458*** 0.2707*** 0.2370***
(0.0550) (0.0558) (0.0555) (0.0564) (0.0543) (0.0301) (0.0558)
Δpetrorentrat 0.0096 0.0169** 0.0208** 0.0185* 0.0202** 0.0146** 0.0164**
(0.0077) (0.0072) (0.0088) (0.0102) (0.0082) (0.0071) (0.0070)
Indirect election ‐0.0008
(0.0008)
Direct election 0.0005
(0.0007)
Indirect election * Δpetrorentrat ‐0.0580***
(0.0112)
Direct election * Δpetrorentrat ‐0.0325***
(0.0075)
Single party legal ‐0.0002
(0.0008)
Multiple parties legal ‐0.0013
(0.0009)
Single party legal*Δpetrorentrat ‐0.0233**
(0.0097)
Multiple parties legal*Δpetrorentrat ‐0.0249**
(0.0104)
Single party exists ‐0.0002
(0.0009)
Multiple parties exist ‐0.0004
(0.0009)
Single party exists*Δpetrorentrat ‐0.0315**
(0.0130)
Multiple parties exist*Δpetrorentrat ‐0.0143
(0.0132)
Legisl w regime party ‐0.0002
(0.0006)
Legisl w mult parties ‐0.0001
(0.0007)
Legisl w regime party*Δpetrorentrat ‐0.0288**
(0.0121)
Legisl w mult parties*Δpetrorentrat ‐0.0239**
(0.0111)
Exec finite term ‐0.0010*
(0.0006)
Exec finite term*Δpetrorentrat ‐0.0343***
(0.0078)
Potential classif error  0.0003
(0.0006)
Potential classif error *Δpetrorentrat ‐0.0339***
(0.0075)
Observations 841 841 841 841 841 832 841
Number of panelid 56 56 56 56 56 55 56
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: Base categories for institutional variables are: Executive selection ‐ No elections; De jure parties ‐ All parties legally banned; De facto parties ‐ No 
parties exist; Legislative parties ‐ No legislature or non‐partisan legislature; Executive finite term ‐ No finite term. Type II classification error ‐ no error. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated with: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; and * p<0.1. 
 Δhavenrat
Table 6. Robustness: Non‐haven deposits, fuel exports and country fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political regime Autocracies Autocracies Autocracies Non‐democracies
Measure Polity Polity Polity Przeworski et al.
Conditioning variable Executive selection
Robustness Non‐haven deposits Fuel exports Fixed effects Fixed effects
Δnonhavenrat (lagged) 0.1331*
(0.0706)
Δhavenrat (lagged) 0.4650*** 0.3396*** 0.1845***
(0.0748) (0.0589) (0.0606)
Δpetrorentrat 0.0093 0.0178*** 0.0149**
(0.0107) (0.0064) (0.0074)
Δnetgdprat 0.0023 0.0007 0.0058* ‐0.0043
(0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0038)
Δfuelexportrat 0.0238***
(0.0049)
Indirect election 0.0023
(0.0021)
Direct election 0.0045**
(0.0022)
Indirect election * Δpetrorentrat ‐0.0492***
(0.0129)
Direct election * Δpetrorentrat ‐0.0384***
(0.0106)
Observations 446 328 446 841
Number of panelid 43 35 43 56
Controls YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Country FE NO NO YES YES
Note: Base categories for institutional variables are: Executive selection ‐ No elections. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in 
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated with: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; and * p<0.1. 
Figures 1a‐1b: Year‐to‐year variation in haven deposits and petroleum rents
Note: The figures show the distribution of annual growth rates in haven deposits (Figure 1a) and petroleum rents (Figure 1b) 
respectively across all country‐years. 
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